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This method also uses compromised WordPress sites to deliver the content, but instead uses HTML pages hosted on the compromised site.

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The corresponding code in the PDF file source links these buttons to a distribution site, hxxps://sseiatcasite: /Annots

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The actual content of these malicious PDFs is limited to the text of the targeted search term and two download buttons -one for the PDF component, the other for DOC: When the link in the search engine is clicked, the web browser opens the malicious PDFs as it would any other PDF document on the web. In most of the cases, compromised WordPress sites were used to host PDF files, specifically in the wp-content/uploads/formidable directories on those websites.In other cases, the same PDF content was stored in an Amazon cloud site, or a CDN site. In another set of lures, the initial deceptive content used for SEO is stored in PDF files hosted on websites the search engines linked to the PDF files themselves directly as a result of the malicious SEO efforts. It also shows that the criminals were not particularly picky about their chosen search terms-they cast a wide net, aiming for many target interests and potential target types.

This aligns with the statistics gathered from the MSI installers, showing the efficiency of the method. The word cloud below displays the frequency of keywords in those search terms: However, we were able to collect the keywords from the group posts to analyze the search terms the criminals behind the campaign were attempting to poison. While the links still resolved as we prepared our analysis, they returned a zero-length response-indicating no content remained at the destination. It’s likely that this distribution method was from an older campaign. However, the disguised link leads to a redirection site ( hxxps://abocomteamsdsite/Variable-Length-File-Declaration-In-Cobol“), which is only the next element in the download chain: The comments themselves have no content other than what appears to be links to PDF files, as in the following example: In the first method we observed, the SEO was accomplished through the creation of Google Groups discussions. The attackers created multiple fake Google groups, each with 500-600 fake conversation entries, targeting the most common search terms in a wide variety of subjects: Based on the names of samples we’ve seen in the wild, the following search keywords appeared to be the most successful from the attacker’s point of view: For example, one of the samples we recovered was named good-choice-bad-choice-worksheet-for-kids.msi. In each of these SEO methods, the name of the MSI installer file matches the search terms. For example, in the following example all three of the distribution methods ended up in the top ten Google hits for the poisoned keywords (marked by method in the screenshot): The criminals used at least three distribution methods for the malware distribution, sometime simultaneously.

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lnk at Windows startup would load the malware from an encrypted payload hidden amongst a “smokescreen” of other, seemingly meaningless files.

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Using Windows registry changes made by the install script, the loading of the. lnk file into Windows’ startup directory to establish persistence. The PowerShell script modified the Windows registry and dropped a.

These lure sites, in turn, attempted to deceive users into downloading a Windows installer. When downloaded, the malicious Microsoft installer (.msi) files would in turn execute a decoy install program, while at the same time launching a PowerShell script that installed the malware. These SEO efforts, which leveraged a combination of Google Groups discussions and deceptive web pages and PDF documents hosted on compromised (usually WordPress) websites, were so effective that the SolarMarker lures were usually at or near the top of search results for phrases the SolarMarker actors targeted. While this sort of SEO poisoning has been seen in the past, it has rarely been seen used beyond some recent downloader-as-a-service operations. The campaigns followed a common pattern: Using malicious SEO techniques, the SolarMarker actors were able to place links to web sites with deceptive content in search results from multiple search engines. These installers used an unusual method to ensure the persistence of the SolarMarker backdoor.

In October, 2021, we observed a set of active SolarMarker campaigns that combined search engine optimization (SEO) targeting with custom-made MSI installer packages to deliver the payload. NET malware usually delivered by a PowerShell installer has information harvesting and backdoor capabilities.

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Over the past seven months, SophosLabs has monitored a series of new efforts to distribute SolarMarker, an information stealer and backdoor (also known as Jupyter or Polazert).